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International Investment Law has become one of the hot topics of the current debate on a future sustainable 
international economic order. Several international fora (OECD, UNCTAD, ICSID, UNCTAD, EU) keep 
working on a reform of this area (in particular the dispute settlement) and newsletters and blogs are full of 
criticism of the current system both with regard to the substance and the procedures. At the same time, this 
is not a new phenomenon and especially in the case of Switzerland the respective discussions go back for more 
than a century. This is not surprising when one looks at the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) for 
this country and the legal practice that the Swiss administration has developed to remain an attractive seat of 
foreign investors and a competitive place for the settlement of (investment) disputes. This (short) introduction 
to the contributions from the scientific conference held in the framework of the Annual Meeting of the Swiss 
Society of International Law (SSDI/SVIR) held in Lausanne on 13 November 2020 tries to show why the 
current debate on international investment law is so important for Switzerland and which questions will oc-
cupy the administration, practicing lawyers, tribunals, academia and civil society in the years to come.
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I. Diplomatic Practice in the 19 th and early 20th Century
A. Treaties of Friendship and Establishment
In the diplomatic practice of Switzerland, the presence of Swiss investors abroad has 
played an important role since the 19 th century. This is originally due to the small size 
of the country and the need to procure raw materials and important inputs into do-
mestic production abroad. Furthermore, due to a very rapid industrialisation of the 
country in second half of the 19 th century, the presence of Swiss companies abroad 
involved in the sale of Swiss manufactured products (textiles, watches, chemicals and 
later machines and pharmaceutical products) became more and more important.1 
This effect was exacerbated by the need to have production facilities in foreign mar-
kets to overcome existing tariff barriers and other obstacles to trade. In addition, the 
fact, that the country has no direct access to the sea (except by the Rhine from its 
international port at Basel)2 and for a long time not commercial ships under its flag 
(i.e. registered in Switzerland) led to a need to use ships under foreign flag or secure 
foreign shipping and transport services to stabilize the supply of the country and its 
industry.
It comes therefore at no surprise that when it became possible Switzerland tried 
to secure its interests in bilateral treaties during the late 19 th century following the 
model established by the UK and other important economic players in Europe (and 
to a lesser extent overseas).3 Treaties of Friendship were negotiated with the United 
Kingdom in 1855, with France in 1855, with the Habsburg Empire in 1869 , with the 
newly established German Empire in 1870 and with the Netherlands in 1875. They 
normally included provisions on the establishment of foreigners and the protection 
they were entitled to. Later Switzerland negotiated also specific treaties of establish-
ment, e.g. with Belgium in 1887, with Serbia in 1888 or with Spain in 1879 .4
B. Diplomatic Protection 
In the 20th century, an increasing number of cases Swiss investors abroad turned to 
the Swiss Government to obtain diplomatic protection following foreign govern-
1 See, for example, Andreas R. Ziegler, «Der völkerrechtliche Status der Schweiz», 29  Swiss Rev. 
Int’l & Eur. L.  (2019 ), 549 –580; Jean-François Bergier, Magdalena Bless-Grabher & 
Trude Fein, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Schweiz, 2nd ed., Zurich 19 9 0; Patrick Halbeisen, 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Schweiz im 20. Jahrhundert, Basel 2012.
2 Secured through international treaties but obviously vulnerable during times of crisis of armed conflict. 
See, for example, Walter Zürcher, Schweizer Flagge zur See, Bern 19 86. 
3 For details see, Andreas R. Ziegler, Droit international économique, 2nd ed., Bern 2017, at 24.
4 See for a list of currently still applicable treaties of establishment (many going back to this time): <https://
www.sem.admin.ch/dam/sem/de/data/rechtsgrundlagen/weisungen/auslaender/recht/niederlassungs 
vertraege-d.pdf.download.pdf/niederlassungsvertraege-d.pdf> (visited on 14 March 2021).
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mental measures that were considered unfriendly or a violation of international 
standards. As a result, one of the only two cases Switzerland took to the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration was related to diplomatic protection of a Swiss investor abroad. 
A Swiss construction company (Losinger & Cie. SA) that had entered into a con-
struction contract with the Kingdome of Yugoslavia requested the help of the Swiss 
Government after the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had adopted a new law that barred the 
recourse to international arbitration (as guaranteed in the construction contract). 
This breach of contract triggered the intervention of the Swiss Government and a 
claim before the PCIJ.5 Before a judgment could be delivered Switzerland and Yugo-
slavia found an amicable solution.6
Another important factor for the Swiss policy regarding the treatment of its citi-
zens and companies abroad was the experience following the revolution in Russia 
leading to the creation of the Soviet Union in 19 18/19 . As for other Western Euro-
pean countries, the 19 th century had seen an important number of Swiss leaving the 
country – be it to escape widespread poverty or otherwise to find a better fate. An 
important number of Swiss had emigrated to Russia and the country was an interest-
ing destiny for Swiss investments (like from other Western economies). The confisca-
tion and expropriation of Swiss assets in Russia after 19 18 led to protest by the Swiss 
Government which even shortly considered counter-measures in the form of freezing 
Russian assets.7 In 19 18 the diplomatic relations with Russia were suspended and due 
to some further problems resulting from the murder of a high representative of the 
Soviet Union in Lausanne (the so-called Corradi Affaire) remained tense for dec-
ades.8 This experience can be seen as typical example of the unwarranted side effects 
diplomatic protection can have in certain situations. 
C. Dubious Nationality and the Control Theory
This was particularly important during armed conflicts or in cases where Swiss inves-
tors abroad were not recognized as such because it was difficult to develop a specific 
country profile distinct from its bigger neighbours, in particular the German Empire 
after its unification. In particular, during WWI and WWII it became increasingly 
important for the Swiss Government to protect Swiss investors who only controlled 
5 Affaire Losinger & Cie. (Suisse c. Yougoslavie), 19 36 C.P.J.I. (ser. A/B) No. 69  (Ordonnance du 14 décem-
bre).
6 See also Lucius Caflisch, Internationaler Gerichtshof (2007), in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz 
(hereinafter: HLS), online.
7 See Peter Collmer, Russland (2016), in: HLS online.
8 See Andreas R Ziegler, «Die Rolle des Völkerrechts in aussenpolitischen Krisen der Schweiz  – 
Wichtige völkerrechtlicher Streitfälle, Verträge, diplomatische Dokumente und Urteile betreffend die 
internationalen Beziehungen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft», 138 Zeitschrift für Schweize-
risches Recht (2019 ), 429 –456.
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foreign investment but had a foreign (in particular German) nationality or citizen-
ship. In view of the perceived stability and neutrality of the country many foreign 
investors chose Switzerland for incorporating vehicles that would control their in-
vestment in third countries. Only later specific legislative measures were adopted to 
remain attractive: limited legal and administrative assistance for tax evasion (bank-
ing secrecy) dates from 19 34 and the favourable tax treatment of foreign holding 
companies from the 19 50 though already before an attractive tax treatment had led 
to an increased attractiveness of Switzerland for foreign investors.9  
During WWI it was the case of Carl Ingenohl, the main owner of a tobacco com-
pany with important operations in the Philippines named The Orient Tobacco Man-
ufactory that rose to fame. He had obtained Belgian citizenship through naturaliza-
tion, but his ancestors were German.10 At the same time, Swiss citizens had purchased 
important participations in his conglomerate (e.g. Walter Edelmann from Zurich). 
When the US authorities confiscated the company, the Belgian and Swiss Govern-
ments intervened defending the claim that the investors were not German but from 
the officially neutral countries Belgium and Switzerland.11
Another case during WW I concerned the Basler Missionsgesellschaft, a trading 
company that had its origin in a protestant missionary movement founded in Basel 
at the beginning of the 19 th century. Over time, the trading activities became more 
important and the company’s assets in India were expropriated by the British Gov-
ernment as the company seemed too close to the German enemy.12
It should come as no surprise that these questions became also increasingly inter-
esting and important for academia and practising lawyers advising their clients. The 
Swiss Society of International Law (SVIR/SSDI) discussed issues related to the dip-
lomatic protection (of investors) on various occasions between the two world wars. 
As early as 19 19  «The nationality of legal persons» was the topic of the scientific 
debate held in the framework of the annual meeting and led to the publication of four 
reports by the SVIR/SSDI. Again in 19 31 the annual conference was dedicated to 
the topic «The nationality of trading companies» and on several occasion the treat-
ment of neutral States during WW I and WW II was discussed, also with regard to 
the nationalisation of the property of investors from neutral States.13 Also important 
9  See Lea Haller, Transithandel, Zurich 2019 , at 319  et seq.
10 His brother Gustav Heinrich Ernst Friedrich von Ingenohl had been the admiral in charge of the German 
European fleet until 19 15, see Hugh Farmer, Carl Ingenohl – owner of the Orient Tobacco Manufactory 
Company, in: The Industrial History of Hong Kong Group, February 24, 2016 (online). 
11 See Lea Haller, supra n. 9 , at 170-2.
12 See Gustav Adolf Wanner, Jubiläumsschrift – Die Basler Handels-Gesellschaft A. G. 1859 –19 59 , 
Basel 19 59 , Chapter IV.3.
13 See Hans Fritzsche, «Die Schweizerische Vereinigung für Internationales Recht», in: Vom Krieg 
und vom Frieden: Festschrift der Universität Zürich zum siebzigsten Geburtstag von Max Huber, Zurich 
19 44, 77–9 7.
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contribution in the research of Swiss authors were dedicated to diplomatic protec-
tion, in particular also of foreign investors.14
During WW II the lack of a proper flag (no ships registered in Switzerland) led 
to the confiscation of cargos owned by Swiss companies being transported by ships 
under foreign flags. This motivated the Swiss Government to immediately promote 
the registration of ships in Switzerland in order to signal the true nationality of the 
ships and thereby protect the supply of Switzerland and the cargos of Swiss investors 
that now could use these ships. Some ships had used a Swiss flag before (in addition 
to the flag of the place of registration), but from 19 41 it became possible to register 
ships in Switzerland.15
The most prominent case regard diplomatic protection of Swiss investors abroad 
is without any doubt the Interhandel saga.16 It can be seen as a further after-effect of 
the alleged abuse of Switzerland to circumvent the financial and economic sanctions 
against the Axis powers by Allies during WW II and was thus related to the problems 
already known from WW I. The resulting dispute led to one of the few proceedings 
with Swiss participation before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and was to 
burden Switzerland’s relations with the USA for years. The company was originally 
founded in Basel in 19 28/9  as a holding company of the German IG Farben Group 
(initially under the name I.G. Chemie).17 In 19 37-40, legal steps were taken to make 
the company appear Swiss (and no longer German) in order to protect IG-Farben 
subsidiaries in the USA from Allied sanctions. The US authorities found the opera-
tion implausible and nevertheless confiscated the subsidiaries in the USA (in particu-
lar the General Aniline and Film Corporation – GAF) after the entry into the war in 
19 42 (as enemy assets under the United States Trading with the Enemy Act). The 
Swiss authorities also apparently had doubts about the nationality of the company 
and had a thorough audit of the companies involved carried out in 19 45/6 (the so-
called Rees Report).18 Due to close personal ties, there remained doubts regarding the 
German control, but the Federal Council withheld the report from public inspection 
and backed Interhandel. The owners took legal action in the USA without a judge-
ment being reached within a reasonable period of time. However, this was also due to 
the fact that the Swiss authorities refused to hand over files for fear of violating bank-
14 See most prominently, Lucius C. Caflisch, La protection des sociétés commerciales en droit interna-
tional public, thèse, La Haye 19 69 .
15 See Hans-Ulrich Schiedt, Schifffahrt (2012), in: HLS online. 
16 See Mario König, Interhandel, in: HLS online, and id., Interhandel – die schweizerische Holding der 
IG Farben und ihre Metamorphosen  – eine Affäre um Eigentum und Interessen 19 10–19 9 9 , Zurich 
2001.
17 The companies Hoechst, Bayer and BASF have their origin in this conglomerate.
18 Revisions-Bericht. Internationale Gesellschaft für Chemische Unternehmungen A.G. (I.G. Chemie), 
Basel, [since 19  December 19 45 Internationale Industrie- und Handelsbeteiligungen A.G., Basel], Bank-
haus E. Sturzenegger & Cie., Basel [formerly Ed. Greuter & Cie., Basel], at 551, (Digitalisat in the data-
base «Dodis der Diplomatischen Dokumente der Schweiz»), online: <https://dodis.ch/9 266>.
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ing secrecy and economic intelligence in the interests of another state.19  In 19 57, the 
original owners withdrew and the major bank SBG (today part of UBS) later took 
over the majority of shares. On 1 October 19 57, Switzerland brought an action against 
the USA before the International Court of Justice and demanded that the USA re-
lease the seized assets of Interhandel in the USA. On 3 October 19 57, Switzerland 
also applied for provisional measures to prevent the USA from selling the affected 
parts of the company. The provisional measures were rejected on 24 October 19 57, 
and the judgement was issued on 21 March 19 59 . Although the domestic legal pro-
ceedings appeared to have little chance of success and had been pending for a very 
long time, the court considered that the domestic remedies had not been exhausted, 
as would have been necessary for diplomatic protection.20 It was not until 19 63-65 
that UBS was able to obtain around 40% of the original property in an out-of-court 
settlement with the US authorities.21 To protect the bank’s interests against further 
legal challenges, the Federal Council kept the Rees Report under wraps until the in-
vestigations by the Independent Commission of Experts (UEK) Switzerland – Sec-
ond World War (2002), which fuelled speculation about its contents.22
II. Modern Swiss Investment Treaty Practice
A. Switzerland as a Pioneer in BIT negotiations 
After Germany, Switzerland was the first Western country to negotiate and sign a 
bilateral investment treaty of the kind that we still consider today as the main model 
for such agreements. In 19 61 such an agreement was concluded with Tunisia.23 With 
regard to the typical structure of these agreements they are comparable to those con-
cluded by other Western countries, in particular following a similar approach like 
Germany, the Netherlands, or the United Kingdom. Initially (approximately from 
19  See Volker Koop, Das schmutzige Vermögen. Das Dritte Reich, die IG Farben und die Schweiz, 
 Munich 2005, and Shraga Elam, Die Schweiz und die Vermögen der I.G. Farben: Die Interhandel-Af-
färe, 13 Zeitschrift für Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts (19 9 8) 13, 61–9 1, online: <https://
shraga-elam.blogspot.de/2013/06/die-schweiz-und-die-vermogen-der-ig.html>.
20 International Court of Justice, Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), all documents 
online: <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/34>.
21 In the 19 80s, «I.G. Farben in Liquidation» brought an unsuccessful lawsuit against SBG in Germany 
(cf. the documents in DODIS of the UEK, <http://dodis.ch/26246>). Furthermore, in the 19 9 0s, pro-
tests by former forced labourers and other Holocaust victims of IG Farben led to the creation of a foun-
dation for the compensation of victims of IG Farben, which was dissolved in 2015 due to a lack of funds.
22 See König, supra n. 16, und UEK, supra n. 21.
23 See Anne-Juliette Bonzon, La protection des investissements suisses à l’étranger dans le cadre des 
accords de protection et de promotion des investissements, Basel 2012, at 40 and 43. For the treaty see FF 
19 62 I 634. It was renegotiated in the early 19 70s, see Accord de coopération technique et scientifique 
entre la Confédération suisse et la République tunisienne, conclu le 27 octobre 19 72, RS 0.9 74.275.8.
31 SRIEL (2021) 185
Switzerland and International Investment Law: Why it Matters
19 61  to 19 78) these agreements were mostly concluded with newly independent 
countries (i.e. former colonies) in Africa in order to create a beneficial framework for 
Swiss investors either already present or looking at entering those markets. With re-
gard to today’s legal debates it is important that these agreements did not yet include 
any provisions allowing private investors to ask for the settlement of disputes with the 
host country by way of international arbitration (Investor State Dispute Settlement – 
ISDS).24 
In the 19 80s, however the negotiations in this field were considerably intensified 
and a large number of agreements was negotiated, normally including provision on 
ISDS. The Agreement with Sri Lanka of 19 81 was the first agreement in this group.25 
Another peculiarity was that these agreements no longer included important devel-
opment cooperation activities but solely focused on the promotion and protection of 
investments. As it is the case of other important exporters of capital, the number of 
treaties negotiated after 19 9 0 with former communist countries and transitions 
countries in Europe skyrocketed.26
B. Change of Tide?
At the end of the 19 9 0s and in the early years of the 21st century, Switzerland benefit-
ted from the general climate favouring new trade and investment agreements, espe-
cially between emerging economies and industrialized countries. This led to the ne-
gotiation of combined economic agreements containing an investment chapter27 
(normally also including commitments with regard to market access or establishment 
for foreign investors) or the parallel negotiation of trade and investment agreements. 
The latter was especially useful when Switzerland wanted to use its preferred for-
mat of negotiating agreements as a member of the European Free Trade Association 
(together with Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) but could not include a (compre-
hensive) investment chapter (or at least certain important provisions) due to resist-
ance within EFTA, in particular Norway.28 In cases where Switzerland could not use 
24 See Bonzon, supra n. 23, at 46.
25 Accord entre le Gouvernement de la Confédération suisse et le Gouvernement de la République démocra-
tique socialiste de Sri Lanka concernant l’encouragement et la protection réciproque des investissements, 
conclu le 23 septembre 19 81, RS 0.9 75.271.2.
26 See Bonzon, supra n. 23, at 51. 
27 For example, Accord de libre-échange du 27 novembre 2000 entre les États de l’AELE et les États-Unis du 
Mexique (avec acte fin., prot. d’entente et annexes), RS 0.632.315.631.1 or Accord de libre-échange du 
26 juin 2002 entre les États de l’AELE et la République de Singapour (avec prot. d’entente et annexes), 
0.632.316.89 1.1.
28 See for example Accord sur l’investissement du 15 décembre 2005 entre la République d’Islande, la Prin-
cipauté du Liechtenstein, la Confédération suisse et la République de Corée (avec annexes), RS 0.9 75.228.1 
negotiated in parallel to Accord de libre-échange du 15 décembre 2005 entre les États de l’AELE et la 
République de Corée (avec annexes et prot. d’entente), RS 0.632.312.811.  
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the EFTA framework because of other areas where no agreement with the third coun-
try could be reached, Switzerland included normally important investment chapters 
in its new comprehensive economic agreements, such as in the case with Japan.29  
However, even the purely bilateral or parallel approach becomes increasingly dif-
ficult in recent years. In certain instances, it became impossible to reach agreement 
on the exact content of the appropriate substantive standards and, in particular on 
ISDS. For example, the bilateral trade agreement with China of 2013 contains only 
provisions on promotion of investments and a review clause in view of future negoti-
ations.30 The same is true for the Agreement with the Philippines of 201631 or the 
most recent agreement with Indonesia in 2019 .32 
This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that a number of long-standing treaty 
partners of Switzerland have terminated existing bilateral investments treaties, and 
the attempted negotiations of new ones are highly controversial. Examples are the 
termination of their respective agreements with Switzerland (but also other coun-
tries) by South Africa, India, or Indonesia. The last traditional agreement on the pro-
motion and protection of investments was concluded by Switzerland with Georgia in 
2014.33
Although there were some early academic writings on the topic, the area remained 
known and was discussed only by a relatively small group of experts be it in the ad-
ministration or the investors who would benefit from these agreements. The main 
reason for the absence of a real debate outside of very narrow circles of academics, 
administration and the multinational companies concerned (in particular repre-
sented by the respective business lobby) lies in the fact that the Federal Government 
had managed between 19 63 and 2004 to exclude Parliament from the approval pro-
cess of such agreements.34 As a matter of fact, the Parliament had delegated full power 
to the Federal Government (and the administration) to negotiate bilateral invest-
ment treaties. This system was also maintained after the inclusion of ISDS provisions 
into these agreements. In 2006, however, the Federal Government accepted that the 
29  See Accord du 19   février 2009  de libre-échange et de partenariat économique entre la Confédération 
 suisse et le Japon, RS 0.9 46.29 4.632.
30 See Chapter 9  of the Accord de libre-échange du 6 juillet 2013 entre la République populaire de Chine et 
la Confédération suisse (avec annexes et prot. d’entente), RS 0.9 46.29 2.49 2. 
31 Accord de libre-échange du 28  avril 2016 entre les États de l’AELE et les Philippines (avec annexes), 
RS 0.632.316.451, Chapter 10.
32 See Message concernant l’approbation de l’accord de partenariat économique de large portée entre les 
États de l’AELE et l’Indonésie, FF 2019  5009 , 5260 ff.
33 See seco, Liste des accords concernant la protection des investissements conclus à ce jour par la Suisse, 
online: <https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/fr/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusam 
menarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/Internationale_Investitionen/Vertragspolitik_der_Schweiz/over 
view-of-bits.html> (visited 14 March 2021).
34 Arrête fédéral of 27 September 19 63 (prolonged in 19 73, 19 83 and 19 9 4). See for details RO 19 9 4 1766) 
and for details Bonzon, supra n. 23, at 59 . 
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increasing important of BITs, the resulting disputes and their controversial character 
no longer justified the total exclusion of these negotiations and agreements from par-
liamentary debate and a more open discussion by the general public.35
III. Switzerland’s Special Role in ISDS
A. Switzerland as a Seat of Arbitration
While Switzerland is certainly in a similar situation with regard to the historic use of 
diplomatic protection and the development of BITs since the 19 50 as other developed 
nations it shares only with very few other states the status of a preferred place for the 
related investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS).This is certainly related to its general 
appeal for arbitration and the respective government policies to favour it.36 In the area 
of commercial arbitration (including sports), the country benefits from the presence of 
international companies and institutions as well as a legal framework that make it at-
tractive for the establishment of arbitration tribunals. In addition, one should men-
tion that this presence of many foreign companies (including state-owned entities) 
and, even more so, its role as a financial and trading centre lead to an important posi-
tion when it comes to the enforcement of arbitral wards. This is also true for ISDS. 
Switzerland is in a similar positions as the Netherlands (due to the presence of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration and many multinational companies), Sweden (due 
to the presence of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and its role in energy dis-
putes) or venues like Vienna, Singapore or Hong Kong while places like Washington, 
New York, London, Paris or Madrid are traditional centres due to their history and 
the resulting infrastructure. This role within the settlement of disputes involving 
States can lead to certain challenges between the State where a court is seated and the 
state party to such legal proceedings and justifies also a proper analysis regarding the 
responsibility regarding the architecture and the outcome of the system as a whole.37
B. The Role of the Swiss Feral Supreme Court
One consequence of the attractiveness of Switzerland as a seat for international arbi-
tration and as a financial centre is the role of Swiss courts in the review of arbitral 
decisions be it because an arbitral award as such is challenged or in proceedings re-
35 See Message fu 22 septembre 2006 concernant les accords de promotion et de protection réciproque des 
investissements avec la Serbie-et-Monténégro, le Guyana, l’Azerbaïdjan, l’Arabie saoudite et la Colombie, 
FF 2006 8041
36 See on this topic a current research project entitled «Essor de l’arbitrage commercial international en 
Suisse (19 58–19 89 )» by Guillaume Beausire at the University of Lausanne.
37 See on this topic a current research project undertaken at the Law School of the University of Lausanne a 
Ara Papyan, supervised by Andreas R. Ziegler.
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lated to the enforcement38 of such an awards. The most striking development in this 
respect with regard to the topic treated in this contribution is the number of ISDS 
cases leading to challenges before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (as single instance 
provided for under Article 19 0 IPRG).39  While in the first decade of the 21st century 
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court had to deal with a handful of cases involving ISDS 
arbitral awards based on BITs40, the number of such cases has mushroomed since 
201541, involving sometimes very controversial question regarding the interpretation 
of the language of these BITs and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). 
Certain of these cases where of a highly political nature (such as a case relating to 
the annexation of Crimea by Russia42), and almost all of these cases were of a certain 
importance for the countries concerned. Admittedly the competence to review these 
cases is relatively limited (arbitration-friendly) but this does not automatically justify 
the outcome or prevent certain (political) reactions by the States involved. Despite 
the professional and impartial approach normally attempted by the courts (and cer-
tainly the Federal Supreme Court), this situation is not without challenges and could 
lead to dangerous tensions in the future.43 This is one reason why ICSID and a mul-
tilateral investment court (MIC, as proposed currently by the EU)44 would avoid this 
involvement of (certain) national courts in ISDS. A debate on the role of domestic 
courts has been launched45 but with regard to Swiss courts or the specific role of the 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court this debate needs still to be launched. 
38 See on this issue Alexander Laute & Andreas R. Ziegler, «Vereinbarkeit des Merkmals der 
‹hinreichenden Binnenbeziehung› mit dem New Yorker Übereinkommen zur Anerkennung und Voll-
streckung von ausländischen Schiedssprüchen – Zugleich Besprechung des Urteils des Bundesgerichts v. 
7. Sept. 2018 – Az.: 5A_9 42/2017», 18 SchiedsVZ – German Arbitration Journal (2020), 286–29 3.
39  Federal Law on International Private Law, RS 29 1.
40 The most relevant are 4P.114/2006, 4P.9 8/2005, 4P.154/2005, 4P.200/2001, and 1P.113/2000.
41 The most relevant are 4A_461/2019 , 4A_306/2019  (146 III 142), 4A_80/2018 (publication in the offi-
cial record pending), 4A_65/2018, 4A_39 6/2017 (144 III 559 ), 4A_39 8/2017, 4A_157/2017, 
4A_9 8/2017 (143 III 462), 4A_616/2015, 4A_34/2015 (141 III 49 5).
42 See 144 III 559 .
43 See on this topic a current PhD project by Manon Schlaepfer (supervised by Andreas R. Ziegler) at the 
Law School of the University of Lausanne.
44 See the discussion on a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) such as summarized in Marc Bungen-
berg & August Reinisch, Draft Statute of the Multilateral Investment Court, Baden-Baden 2021, 
and Andreas R. Ziegler, «Common Commercial Policy (CCP)», in: Gormley Laurence et al. (eds.) 
Online Encyclopaedia of European Union Law, Oxford (forthcoming).
45 See, for example, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, «The Path to Reform of 
ISDS: What Role for National Courts?», in: Investor-State Dispute Settlement and National Courts. 
European Yearbook of International Economic Law, Heidelberg 2020 (<https://doi.org/10.1007/9 78-3-
030-44164-7_4>).
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C. The Role of Practitioners Based in Switzerland
The use (and promotion) of Switzerland as an attractive seat of arbitral tribunals and 
the reputation for a stable, neutral and service-oriented legal profession translates 
also into the presence of specialized law firms and the prominent role of persons ac-
tive in Switzerland as arbitrators, counsel46 and expert witness. As an illustration, one 
can mention figures assembled by UNCTAD in 2017 where among the ten arbitra-
tors most often appointed in known ISDS arbitral proceedings figures Gabrielle 
Kaufmann Kohler (appointed in 49  procedures between 19 87 and 2017, being only 
one of the two women in this list). Though for a long time a part-time member of the 
Geneva Law Faculty, she had been working as arbitrator for most of her active career, 
originally as member of well-established Geneva law firms47 and later with her own 
boutique firm.48 Other names of Swiss practitioners (or based in Switzerland) that 
appear regularly with numerous appointments in rankings regarding of known ISDS 
arbitrations (compiled by UNCTAD) are Pierre Tercier, Laurent Lévy, Charles 
Poncet and Veijo Heiskanen.49
On 29  January 2021, the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (seco) published 
a new Swiss list of ICSID arbitrators and mediators. A public call for tenders was held 
for the first time in autumn 2020.50 What is striking about the new list is that, also 
as a first, parity between women and men was enforced by the Federal Council. In 
addition, six of the eight persons on the list are practitioners who offer their services 
commercially, while only two of the women named on the list can be described as 
actual academics. From this, a fundamental support by the Federal Council of the 
strongly commercial and practical nature of today’s investment arbitration can be 
inferred, which is certainly also due to Switzerland’s importance as an arbitration 
centre. 
Other actors, especially the EU, are much more critical in this regard.51 The cor-
responding negotiations to realise reform efforts in UNCITRAL52 and ICSID53 are 
ongoing. The Swiss Government has included Gabrielle Kaufmann Kohler as mem-
46 See on this issue which cannot be developed here further: Andreas R. Ziegler & Jonathan 
R. Kabre, «The Legitimacy of Private Lawyers Representing States Before International Tribunals», 
in: Freya Baetens (ed.), Unseen Actors in International Law, Cambridge 2019 , 544–565.
47 From 19 85 to 19 9 5 as a partner with Baker & McKenzie and between 19 9 6 and 2007 with Schellenberg 
Wittmer.
48 In 2008 she was a co-founder of the law firm Lévy Kaufmann-Kohler.
49  See <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement>. 
50 Call of 30 November 2020, online.
51 See Bungenberg & Reinisch, supra n. 44.
52 UNCITRAL – Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, 40 the session 8–12 Feb-
ruary 2021, Vienna.
53 ICSID launched the current amendment process in October 2016, inviting member states to propose is-
sues that merit consideration. In January 2017, the ICSID Secretariat issued a similar invitation to the 
public requesting proposals for rule changes.
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ber of the official delegation for the reform negotiations. She figures also on the Swiss 
ICSID list.
IV. Challenges for the Future
As one can easily see from this short introduction, the importance of these current 
debates and developments of international investment law for Switzerland are obvi-
ous and can be summarized like this:
 – The existence of a multilateral framework or a network of bilateral treaties could 
remain important also in the future to protect interest of Swiss investors abroad. 
The presence of various global players (large multinational companies) but also of 
an important number of medium-sized companies in Switzerland that are estab-
lished abroad or have important economic relations and activities abroad depends 
partly on (or at least benefits strongly from) these guarantees. Will Switzerland 
still be able to conclude such agreements? Will a multilateral framework be real-
istic in the near future? 
 – The rather broad scope of these agreements when it comes to the definition who 
qualifies as a Swiss investor and the business-friendly provisions of such agree-
ment help the country to attract foreign capital that uses Switzerland to manage 
and control foreign investments (in addition to other benefits that the country 
has to offer). At the same time, the attractiveness of Switzerland for important 
players (e.g. in controversial areas like trading of raw materials or mining) may 
lead to a reputational risk (or at least exposure) and a call for mor stringent regu-
lation at domestic level (or the limitation of treaty benefits). Will it be possible 
and domestically acceptable for Switzerland to conclude treaties that follow its 
traditional business-friendly model? Should the country take a more pro-active 
position in rebalancing obligations and rights contained in such treaties?
 – When it comes to dispute settlement the questions regarding the possibility and 
appropriateness to include the option of ISDS will have to be addressed. In addi-
tion, the question whether the existing arbitration model shall be used and fa-
voured or whether the EU-sponsored model of a Multilateral Investment Court 
(MIC) should be endorsed will cannot be avoided in the long run. Should the EU 
manage to impose its MIC-based system, will this certainly have effects on the use 
of traditional arbitral tribunals for ISDS in Switzerland – this could be positive 
or negative. Domestic criticism could enforce the international discussion and 
require a revised approach or at least a debate on the choices made.
 – When it comes to the role of counsel and the Federal Supreme Court in Switzer-
land, there could be a discussion whether the existing tradition and the current 
legal framework with a relatively lean control of arbitral awards is appropriate and 
whether the position of the country as a whole benefits from the existing model. 
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Here again, domestic criticism could easily lead to a need to more pro-actively 
revisit the existing legal framework and the replacement of an arbitration-based 
model in favour of a multilateral solution established by a group of like-minded 
states. 
